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Transferring resources from developed countries to less 
developed countries (LDCs) through foreign assistance programs 
is largely made up of commodity assistance such as food aid, or 
by foreign exchange assistance. Both of these forms have been 
used to transfer large amounts of resources to LDCs in the last 
30 years, and both have had far more problems and negative side 
effects than had been expected. While the direct impact of this 
assistance on the LDCs is well known, its indirect effects, espe-
cially on the agricultural sector and on financial intermedi-
aries that service agriculture, have not been adequatel~ addressed. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine these indirect 
effects of commodity and foreign exchange assistance on the per-
for.mance of rural financial markets (RFMs) in LDCs. We will argue 
that these indirect effects may reduce in a fundamental way, the 
farmers' ability to borrow, save, and repay loans, and thereby 
substantially weaken the ability of financial institutions to 
mobilize and lend funds in rural areas. 
Foreign assistance creates opportunities for the recipient 
countries to change economic policy to promote more rapid economic 
*Professor of Agricultural Economics, The Ohio State Univer-
sity and Visiting Professor of Agricultural Economics, The Ohio 
State University and Professor of Economics, University of Miami. 
The authors are indebted to Dale W Adams for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft. 
- 2 -
growth, but at the same time the opportunity may be wasted because 
the foreign assistance may also enable the recipient to delay mak-
ing tough economic policy changes. The ~reditworthiness and sav-
ings capacity of farmers and the ability of financial institutions 
to mobilize resources and recover loans importantly depends on 
local economic policies. For example, agricultural prices, ex-
change rates and interest rate policies can either stimulate the 
economic growth and prosperity of the agricultural sector or con-
tribute to its stagnation. Policies that depress agricultural 
prices and discourage production affect farm income and conse-
quently the ability of farmers to save and borrow funds. Even 
the very best rural financial institution will have difficulty 
mobilizing and lending funds in a depressed agricultural economy. 
In the next section of this paper we will elaborate on these ar-
guments and also analyze the extent to which many LDCs have fol-
lowed policies of low prices for agricultural products because of 
the Public Law 480 Food for Peace program. The following section 
will analyze the extent to which over-valued exchange rates in 
many LDCs may have further contributed to low prices in the agri-
cultural sector. The final section summarizes the main conclu-
sions of the analysis for government price, exchange rate and 
interest rate policies. 
Food Aid 
Recently the number and extent of food aid programs has in-
creased rapidly with the addition of the European Economic Commun-
ity, Canada, Australia and others to the list of major food donors. 
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Food export subsidies and the danger of food trade wars between 
the EEC and the U.S. suggest that competition for more exports 
among donors is strong. One indication of this increased com-
petition among food aid donors is that the U.S. share of food 
aid in cereals has declined from over 90 percent of the total in 
the mid-1960s to slightly over half of the total in the early 
1980s. Since an analysis of the indirect effects of all these 
programs on RFMs is beyond the scope of the present paper, the 
U.S. Public Law 480 program is selected to illustrate these 
effects because it is the largest food aid progra~. 
The U.S. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
of 1954 (also known as Public Law 480 or Food For Peace) under 
which nearly $32 billion of food assistance has been provided to 
recipient countries on a concessionary basis has been a generally 
politically popular program in the U.S. as well as in the recip-
ient countries. Within the U.S., food assistance has had strong 
support among farm groups because it represents an important out-
let for farm products and among other groups because food assist-
ance to the poor and hungry of the LDCs has appealled to humani-
tarian values. In addition, food aid is popular because it is 
thought to be additional aid that would not otherwise be available 
from donor countries. 
There are several arguments in favor of food aid in terms of 
its impact on recipient countries. One of these arguments is that 
food aid can have a favorable impact on the poorest of the poor 
through distribution at concessionary prices or through food-for-
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work projects. Another argument is that food aid can provide 
financing for government development projects which promote eco-
nomic growth and increased self reliance in the recipient country. 
It is also widely argued that food aid can assist the recipient 
country to accumulate inventories of basic foods that can be used 
to stabilize farm and consumer prices and to assure adequate food 
supplies. 
The P.L. 480 Law as amended, states that it is U.S. policy 
"to expand international tradei to develop and expand export mar-
kets for U.S. agricultural commodities; to use the abundant agri-
cultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and 
malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the develop-
ing countries, with particular emphasis on assistance to those 
countries that are determined to improve their own agricultural 
production; and to promote in other ways the foreign policy of 
the United States."Y Inconsistencies in the above objectives 
are readily apparent since the expansion of export markets for 
U.S. agricultural commodities can easily conflict with efforts 
to increase agricultural production in developing countries. 
As shown in Table 1, total P.L. 480 assistance equalled 
nearly 32 billion U.S. dollars from July, 1954 through September 
1981. Of the $32 billion, slightly over $22 billion were Title I 
sales, of which about $12 billion were local currency sales and $10 
billion were long term dollar credit sales and convertible local 
l/Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 
as amended Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, Washington, D.C., 1979, 
p. 1. 
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Table 1: Value of u.s. Farm Products Shipped Under Public 480 Compared Wlth Total 
Exports of u.s. Farm Products, July 1954 through September 30, 1981* 
Pub II c Law 480 
Title I Title II 
I Long-term G:>vernment I 
I Do II ar and to I 
Convertible G:>vernment D:>natlon 
Year I Local D:>nations I through Barter Sales for Currency and World Vo I untary for 
Local I CredIt Food I Relief strategic 
Gurrenc0/ Sa I e;?i Progran~ Agency3} materlalsY 
I I 
----Mflllon dollars----
1955 •••••••••••••• 
1956 •••••••••••••• 
1957 •••••••••••••• 
1958 •••••••••••••• 
1 959 • ••••••••••••• 
1960 •••••••••••••• 
73 
439 
908 
657 
724 
824 
1 961. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 951 
1 962. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 '030 
1963. ••••• ••• • •••• 1,088 
1964. ••••• ••• ••••• 1,056 
1965 •••••••••••••• 1,142 
1 966. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 866 
1967.............. 803 
1 968. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 723 
1969.............. 346 
1970.............. 309 
1971 •••••••••••••• 204 
1972.............. 143 
1 973. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 
1 974 • ••••••••••••• 
1 975 • ••••••••••••• 
1 976 • ••••••••••••• 
July-Sept. 1976 ••• 
Oct.-Sept. 1976-77 
Oct.-Sept. 1977-78 
Oct.-Sept. 1978-79 
Oct.-Sept. 1979-80 
oct.-Sept. 1980-81 
Total 12,292 
19 
57 
48 
158 
181 
178 
300 
427 
506 
539 
535 
661 
575 
762 
650 
316 
760 
739 
793 
859 
770 
9,834 
52 
63 
51 
51 
30 
38 
75 
88 
89 
81 
55 
87 
110 
100 
111 
113 
138 
228 
159 
147 
148 
65 
18 
92 
112 
128 
222 
234 
2,885 
135 
184 
165 
173 
131 
105 
146 
160 
174 
189 
183 
180 
157 
150 
154 
128 
142 
152 
128 
145 
191 
192 
51 
250 
223 
265 
254 
275 
4, 784 
---=Not applicable. Details may not add to totals due to rounding 
125 
298 
401 
100 
132 
149 
144 
198 
48 
43 
32 
32 
23 
6 
1 
1,732 
Total 
p. L. 
480 
385 
984 
1,525 
981 
1,017 
1, 1 , 6 
1,316 
1,495 
1,457 
1,418 
1,5 70 
1,346 
1,271 
1,280 
1,039 
1,056 
1,023 
1,058 
954 
867 
1 '1 01 
907 
385 
1,, 02 
1 ,074 
1 '1 86 
1 '335 
, '279 
All 
Total 
Agricul-
tural 
Exports 
3,144 
3,496 
4,728 
4,003 
3, 719 
4,519 
4,946 
5,142 
5,078 
6,068 
6,097 
6,747 
6,821 
6,383 
5,826 
6,718 
7. 753 
8,046 
12,902 
21,293 
21,578 
22,147 
5,355 
23,974 
27,291 
31,975 
40,481 
43,788 
31,527 350,018 
P.L. 480 
Exports 
as .:3 
Percent 
of Total 
Agrlcul-
tural 
Exports 
12 
28 
33 
24 
27 
24 
26 
29 
29 
23 
26 
20 
19 
20 
18 
16 
13 
13 
7 
4 
5 
4 
7 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
9 
* Oct.-Sept. 1976/77 Is the beginning of the new fiscal year. No comparison wll I be made for Oct.-Sept. 
1975/76 year. 
J! Authorized by Title I, P.L. 480. 
2( Shipments under agreements signed through Dec. 31, 1966, authorized by Title IV, P.L. 480. Shipments under 
agreements signed from Jan. 1, 1967, authorized by Title I, P.L. 480, as amended by P.L. 89-808. 
2( Authorized by Title I I, P.L. 480. Includes World Food Program. 
4/ Authorized by Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 and Section 302, Tltle Ill, P.L. 480 through Dec. 
31, 1966. Authorized by Title II, P.L. 480, as amended by P.L. 89-808, effective Jan. 1, 1949. 
5/ Authorized by Section 303, Tftle Ill, P.L. 480, and other legislation. Includes some shipments In exchange 
for goods and services for u.s. agencies before 1963. 
Source: Food for Peace 1981 Annual Report on Public Law 480. USDA, Washington, D.c. 
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currency sales. Title II donations comprise most of the remaining 
$10 billion in total P.L. 480 assistance. P.L. 480 exports have 
exceeded $1 billion annually nearly every year since 1954 which 
demonstrates that this has been an important market for U.S. farm 
products, especially during the 1960s. 
The distribution of P.L. 480 assistance by major recipients 
demonstrates that the countries have been mostly Asian, some 
Latin American and even a few European (Table 2). Seven coun-
tries (India, South Korea, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, South 
Vietnam and Yugoslavia) have each received over $1 billion of 
P.L. 480 assistance since 1954. In recent years, Egypt has been 
the largest recipient of P.L. 480 assistance while other major 
recipients have been India, Indonesia and Bangladesh. Signifi-
cant reductions in food aid to South Korea, Pakistan, South Vietnam, 
Brazil, Israel, Turkey, Morocco, Taiwan, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, 
Cambodia and Colombia have occurred since 1975. The distribution 
of food assistance by major recipients suggests that a mixture 
of economic and national security interests have been important 
selection criteria. 
The Public Law 480 Food for Peace program was approved to 
provide food commodities to LDCs and to reduce the large food 
stocks in the U.S.; however, the program did not take into account 
the long run impact of cheap food (food prices below market equi-
librium clearing levels) on incentives for agricultural produc-
tion in LDCs. The provision of cheap food imports may not only 
reduce farm prices and hence the incentive to produce food but may 
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Table 2: Major Recipients of Public Law 480 Aid, By Selected Periods 
Fiscal Years July 1. 1954 through September 30. 198la/ 
Country 1954-64 1965-74 1975-81 Total 
-- Hillion Dollars --
India 2,084 2,933 1,023 6,040 
South Korea 493 1,034 445 1,972 
Pakistan 736 906 493 2,135 
Egypt 690 222 1,543 2,455 
Indonesia 212 757 738 1,707 
South Vietnam 130 1,307 27 1,464 
Yugoslavia 783 238 1,021 
Brazil 501 385 11 897 
Israel 289 375 52 716 
Bangladesh 66 775 841 
Turkey 452 218 4 674 
Spain 604 18 622 
Poland 535 33 568 
Morocco 97 264 166 527 
Italy 403 3 406 
Taiwan 237 158 395 
Chile 128 112 199 439 
The Phillippines 89 167 165 421 
Japan 367 367 
Tunisia 96 200 93 389 
United Kingdom 342 11 353 
Sri Lanka 56 101 139 396 
Cambodia 207 145 352 
Colombia 118 131 31 280 
Portugal 59 48 90 297 
Greece 202 43 245 
West Germany 212 3 215 
World Total 11,692 11,463 8,372 31,527 
a/ Includes all countries which directly received over $200 million under all 
titles of P.L. 480 -- sales, grants, and barter -- during fiscal years 
July 1954 through September 30, 1981. 
Source: Annual Reports on Public Law 480 for 1955, 1964, 1974 and 1981, and 
u.s. Agricultural Exports under Public Law 480, ERS Foreign Report 
No. 395, u.s. Department of Agriculture, 1974. 
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also depress incomes in the agricultural sector where the major-
ity of the poor in LDCs is located. The food imports may be 
cheap because of low prices or the soft loan terms on which the 
food is sold. In addition, food imports under P.L. 480 may re-
inforce the cheap food policies that are already popular in many 
LDCs. This type of aid indirectly affects the performance of 
RFMs through its impact on food prices, farm production and food 
policy in recipient countries. These indirect effects can great-
ly reduce the performance of RFMs in LDCs. 
At first glance, food assistance would appear to be a boon 
to financially hard-pressed LDCs that import substantial amounts 
of food. Over the past decade they have increasingly relied on 
food imports to meet the demand from rapidly growing populations 
and some increases in income. Egypt, Sudan, Ghana,·Jamaica, The 
Dominican Republic, Bangladesh and others now depend on sizable 
food imports, even in normal agricultural years. In Bangladesh, 
for example, cereal food aid imports have averaged over 90 per-
cent of total cereal imports in the latter half of the 1970s. 
Cereal food aid was 38 percent of total cereal imports in Sudan 
in this same period I Clay and Singer, 198 2 ] . In The Dominican 
Republic and Jamaica concessionary cereal imports reached 25 per-
cent of total cereal imports in 1980. Many of these countries 
have become dependent on food aid to the extent that termination 
of food aid imports would cause severe food shortages in the re-
cipient country. In most cases, the recipient country would not 
have sufficient foreign exchange to import an equal amount of food 
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through normal commercial channels without sharply curtailing 
imports of other essential goods. A major danger of this massive 
food aid effort is that the recipient countries may become vir-
tually permanently dependent on food aid in the long run rather 
than graduating from food aid to a combination of increased do-
mestic production and commercial imports IAdams and Larson, 1982]. 
Subsidies on food exports from developed countries, whether 
provided directly through product prices or through concessionary 
interest rates on loans extended for the borrower to pay for im-
ported food, may reduce the amount of foreign exchange the re-
cipient countries are forced to use on food imports. The extent 
to which foreign exchange is saved depends upon whether or not 
food aid substitutes for commercial sales. In some cases such 
as Egypt, concessionary sales, combined with low consumer prices, 
create additional demand for wheat and commercial sales were not 
reduced. However, the concessionary sales may have substituted 
for what might have been additional commercial imports [Blue 
et al., 1983]. In the case of Brazil, food aid combined with low 
consumer prices substituted for commercial sales and saved for-
eign exchange [Hall, 1980]. The foreign exchange saving possible 
through food aid may resolve a short term balance of payments pro-
blem that enables the recipient country to import other critical 
non-food items. It may, however, reinforce an over-valued ex-
change rate policy, a problem to be discussed in the next section 
of this paper. 
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The balance of payments support from Public Law 480 Title I 
credit sales are subject to a number of conditions which may make 
such a resource transfer an inferior form of developmental assist-
ance compared with a foreign exchange transfer. The transaction 
is a tied commodity transfer limited to the commodities currently 
available under the program and this varies from year to year. 
Wheat and wheat flour with nearly 60 percent of the value of all 
P.L. 480 exports have been the principal products available through 
the program. Rice, corn, sorghum, vegetable oil and dairy products 
have also been available in more limited amounts. Since the avail-
ability of the commodities varies from year to year, the balance 
of payments support and value of the resource transfer to the re-
cipient country may also be reduced. The fact that Title I sales 
are made on a freight on board (FOB) basis and the requirement 
that at least 50 percent of the commodities should be shipped on 
U.S. flag carriers which are higher cost than other international 
carriers also erode the real value of the resource transfer. In 
addition, the recipient country must continue its usual commercial 
imports from the U,S. and "friendly" exporters and must ensure a 
positive developmental impact of the assistance. While these con-
ditions may be desirable for a variety of reasons, they increase 
the transaction costs of food assistance because of the added time 
and adminstrative costs needed to fulfill these conditions. Fur-
thermore, Title I programs are only on an annual basis. 
Although few research studies have systematically analyzed 
the relationship between food aid and food prices in the recipient 
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countries, several studies have analyzed farm prices in LDCs. 
One reason for the lack of studies is that it is hard to estab-
lish a cause and effect relationship between P.L. 480 and cheap 
food policies in LDCs. The LDCs appear guilty by association 
because it is too commonly observed to be ignored. Peterson 
£1979] estimated the prices received by farmers for output rela-
tive to the price of a major input for 53 countries in 1968-70. 
The results point out that real farm prices are more favorable 
to farmers in developed countries than to farmers in the LDCs 
with a few exceptions such as South Korea and Pakistan, and that 
farm prices in the top ten countries averaged 3.7 times more than 
farm prices in the lowest ten. Food price policies of the LDCs 
tend to result in low farm and consumer prices in contrast to the 
high farm and consumer prices of the developed countries. Con-
sumer welfare seems to be a more important policy objective than 
producer welfare in LDCs. 
Lutz and Scandizzo £1980] in a study of price distortions 
in seven developing countries (Argentina, Egypt, Kenya, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Thailand, and Yugoslavia) found substantial disincen-
tive effects on food production because of heavy implicit and ex-
plicit taxation of the agricultural sector. Agriculture was 
penalized in 21 out of the 24 cases studied in these seven coun-
tries. As a consequence, agricultural production is discouraged, 
while consumption is subsidized, and the opportunity for more 
foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports is lost. 2 / 
~/Larson and Vogel Il980] in a study of price and price policy 
in Costa Rican agriculture found that government policy toward the 
agricultural sector resulted in declining real farm prices and the 
stagnation of farm output in the 1970s. 
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Three countries (Egypt, Pakistan and Yugoslavia) of the seven in 
the Lutz and Scandizzo study have each received over $1 billion 
of P.L. 480 assistance. A recent study of P.L. 480 Title I wheat 
imports in Egypt concluded that an association has existed be-
tween wheat imports and declining or stagnant domestic production 
of wheat. The Egyptian government's policy of keeping bread cheap 
and plentiful, and maintaining artificially low producer prices 
has reduced the economic incentive for farmers to produce wheat 
{Blue et al, 1983]. Thus, it is quite evident that various major 
recipients of P.L. 480 assistance have followed agricultural poli-
cies that depress farm prices and discourage farm output. Clearly 
these low food price policies would have been much more difficult 
to sustain without P.L. 480. 
By lowering agricultural prices, food aid reduces incomes in 
the agricultural sector where a vast majority of the poor in less 
developed countries is located. Although food aid increases the 
incomes of persons receiving the food, this gain may be offset by 
the absolute fall in farm income in rural areas caused by the de-
crease in farm prices due to the food assistance. The ±ood aid 
not only lowers the price to domestic producers of the imported 
good but also the prices to domestic producers of close substi-
tutes. Furthermore, as farmers shift resources from production 
of the imported good to production of other goods the prices of 
the other goods will decline. A study by Dudley and Sandilands 
{1975] found that both production and income of Colombian farmers 
declined because of declining wheat prices caused by P.L. 480 
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wheat shipments and that Colombia imported 1,400,000 tons of 
wheat which could have been produced domestically at a lower 
opportunity cost. Lipton [1977] analyzed the impact of food 
aid on farm income in India and quotes an unidentified report 
from the U.N. Office in Bangkok that the immediate loss to Indian 
farmers in the year of release, before they had time to compen-
sate by switching to other crops, was equivalent to 1.9 percent 
of farm income between 1957-63, 7.7 percent in 1964-67 and 1.2 
percent in 1968-69. 
In addition to the adverse impact cheap food imports have on 
the incomes of farmers in LDCs, these imports reinforce the cheap 
food policies that are already popular in many LDCs. The possi-
bility of cheap food from P.L. 480 may contribute to food and 
agricultural policies that result in less government investment 
in and attention to the problem of food production in the recip-
ient country IHayami and Ruttan, 1971]. These policies include 
price ceilings, forced sales of products to government agencies 
at low prices, agricultural export restrictions, "taxes" levied 
on farmers by commodity marketing boards and distorted exchange 
rates that tax agricultural exports and subsidize food imports. 
These cheap food policies are a major reason for the grinding 
poverty that gnaws at rural families in many LDCs. Such poverty 
adversely affects the ability of farmers to borrow, save and re-
pay loans and consequently the performance of RFMs in LDCs. 
Policies that depress farm prices and discourage farm output 
destroy the roots of agricultural development in LDCs. Since the 
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price of the product and the amount produced strongly influence 
farm income, the farmer suffers a substantial loss of income when 
both the output price and amount produced are lower. The decline 
in income may lead to stagnation of the agricultural sector with 
reduced savings and loan demand. In a prosperous growing agri-
culture, the financial institutions will likely have a strong 
loan demand, and a strong record of mobilizing resources and re-
covering loans. It is not surprising that the RFM's of some 
countries such as Taiwan have performed so well while the RFM's 
of other countries such as Ghana have performed so poorly. 
While agriculture may be penalized as a result of food aid, 
recipient governments may prefer the food aid because of the 
benefits to other interest groups, primarily urban based, of the 
country. The lower food prices possible from cheap food imports 
will benefit the industrial user of raw materials, the military, 
government employees, the consumer, and the dominant political 
party in the country ILipton, 1977]. The cheap food imports 
may also enable the government to postpone making some difficult 
economic policy changes such as the appropriate exchange rate, 
interest rate and price level to stimulate agricultural produc-
tion and growth. 
Foreign Exchange Assistance 
Given the shift in U.S. policy toward encouraging agricul-
tural output in developing countries, it is useful to evaluate 
the effects of large amounts of foreign exchange assistance on 
achieving this objective. Commodity aid, such as P.L. 480, has 
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been criticized because it is tied aid; that is, specific commod-
ities are provided that are almost certain to be less valuable 
to an LDC than an equal amount of purchasing power that could be 
spent on whatever imports the LDC might prefer. The transfer of 
foreign exchange from the U.S. which allows LDCs to expand cre-
dit for agriculture while importing whatever commodities happen 
to coincide with the credit expansion thus appears to be an ideal 
way to promote agricultural output in LDCs at minimum cost. This 
approach is reinforced by the view that developed countries, es-
pecially the u.s., have abundant capital potentially available 
for transfer abroad. 
The increased foreign exchange made available through either 
food or funds assistance may resolve short term problems of for-
eign exchange scarcity for the recipient country; however, this 
may also contribute to a far more serious long term economic pro-
blem of an over-valued exchange rate. LDCs typically fix the 
value of their currency in relation to that of a major trading 
partner such as the U.S. dollar and the exchange rate can be 
pegged at a value above what would be determined in a free mar-
ket, when large amounts of foreign exchange grants or loans are 
available. If the official exchange rate is over-valued, then 
revenues received in domestic currency for export sales are accord-
ingly reduced, so that the incentives for producers to export, or 
even to produce those products which might be exported, are re-
duced.3/ In a similar way the domestic currency costs of imported 
3/see Schuh [1974] for an analysis of exchange rate policy 
and u.s. agriculture. 
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goods are also reduced so that the incentives to import are in-
creased. The net effect of the over-valued exchange rate is to 
tax exports and suLsidize imports both of which will cause an 
even greater problem of foreign exchange scarcity in the future. 
Such a policy impacts agriculture in a substantial way in most 
LDCs because the agricultural sector is a large segment of the 
economy and because agricultural exports typically represent a 
major source of foreign exchange earnings. 
Exchange rates can become over-valued because of differen-
tial rates of inflation among countries and the structure of 
protection of a country.!/ Since all countries have experienced 
some inflation during the 1970s, the exchange rate will become 
over-valued whenever the rate of inflation of an LDC is greater 
than that of the rate of inflation of its major trading partners. 
Domestic costs and prices will increase faster than the costs and 
prices of the foreign imported goods making the latter relatively 
less expensive. Protective trade policies such as import tariffs 
and quotas and export taxes and quotas also lead to an over-
valued exchange rate by raising the domestic price of the pro-
tected good or lowering the price of the export good. 
The over-valued exchange rates act as an implicit tax on the 
agricultural sector for countries that export agricultural goods 
while consumers of food are subsidized indirectly because of the 
-
4/see Officer [1976] for a discussion of these arguments and 
Balassa and Associates [1971] for a full discussion of effective 
protection and for estimates of effective protection for several 
developing countries including Brazil and Chile. Bale and Lutz 
[1981] estimate price distortions in agriculture for nine coun-
tries: France, Germany, F.F., United Kingdom, Japan, Yugoslavia, 
Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan and Thailand. 
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low prices for these items. The depressed prices for food elim-
inate incentives for domestic food production and cause stagna-
tion of the agricultural sector [Pollard and Graham, 1983]. At 
the same time, the imports of food may increase because the over-
valued exchange rate makes food as well as other items relatively 
cheap to import. The over-valued exchange rate benefits urban 
consumers while penalizing rural producers and widens the urban-
rural income gap in LDCs. 
In an economy with an over-valued exchange rate, the govern-
ment frequently possesses a system of exchange rate controls and 
other restrictions to allocate access to foreign exchange among 
importers. In this allocation process an "urban bias" may also 
emerge because the urban importers are more likely to be in fre-
quent contact with the key decisionrnakers than the importer of 
some goods for the agricultural sector. Thus, agriculture may 
also lose in the foreign exchange allocation process. Agricul-
tural producers can be heavily taxed in an economy where the 
commodity exported only earns the official exchange rate while 
some imported commodities needed in the production process must 
be purchased at a parallel market rate because of an insufficient 
allocation of foreign exchange at the official rate. 
In an attempt to compensate agriculture for these depressed 
prices, governments frequently adopt a low interest rate policy 
on agricultural credit or a subsidy on selected farm inputs. How-
ever, such a policy fails to compensate agriculture adequately 
because the interest costs represent a relatively small percent-
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age (about 5 percent) of the total cost of production of most 
farm products. A 25 percent decrease in interest rates will do 
very little to improve p£ofitability in agriculture compared to 
a 25 percent increase in the product price. Thus, appropriate 
exchange rates and higher output prices will do far more to im-
prove profitability and stimulate agricultural production than 
low interest rates. New technology to improve yields can also 
greatly enhance profitability; however, such technology is not 
likely to be developed for and used in an agricultural economy 
with such price and exchange rate policies. 
In a depressed agriculture, RFMs will also fail to perform 
adequately for a variety of reasons. Delinquency rates may be 
high because farmers are less able to repay loans to the finan-
cial institutions. The financial institutions will have diffi-
culty mobilizing resources because the low interest rates offer 
no incentive to save and producers have lower incomes. The 
availability of cheap credit will result in an excess demand for 
credit and lead to a rationing of credit among borrowers. [Vogel 
and Larson, 1980]. Financial institutions will have no incen-
tive to attract new borrowers and/or savers because all the avail-
able funds can readily be lent to the current clientel [Vogel, 
1981]. The financial institutions will be unable to grow in size 
to achieve the economies of scale that would lower the costs of 
financial intermediation. 
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Conclusions 
Foreign assistance to transfer resources from developed 
countries to LDCs in the form of food aid or foreign exchange 
assistance to promote agricultural production and growth has 
very harmful, indirect effects on rural financial markets in 
recipient countries. These indirect effects reduce in a sub-
stantial way the creditworthiness and savings capacity of farm-
ers and the ability of rural financial institutions to mobilize 
resources and recover loans. Transaction costs will be high be-
cause lending is risky and the size of deposits and loans is small. 
While P.L. 480 provides additional food for the LDCs in the 
short run, the long run impact of cheap food consists not only 
in lower farm prices and reduced incentives to produce food in 
LDCs but also in government policies that further depress farm 
prices in LDCs. The easy availability of foreign exchange as-
sistance makes it possible for the recipient countries to persist-
ently maintain an over-valued exchange rate that further de-
presses farm prices, discourages farm output and lowers farm in-
come. The over-valued exchange rate acts as an implicit tax on 
exports and subsidy on imports that benefits urban consumers 
through cheaper food and penalizes rural producers. 
Such economic policies lead to a depressed agricultural 
economy. These conditions contribute in a significant way to 
the poor performance of rural financial markets in LDCs. In the 
past, a lot of time has been devoted to the analysis of financial 
pol~cies and their impact on RFMs while ignoring the indirect 
effect of price and exchange rate policy on RFMs. These other 
- 20 -
policies are also important. The RFMs cannot succeed in LDCs 
with an agriculture subjected to these inappropriate economic 
policies. 
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